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Abstract: Many philosophers consider that memory is just a passive information retention 
and retrieval capacity. Some information and experiences are encoded, stored, and 
subsequently retrieved in a passive way, without any control or intervention on the subject’s 
part. In this paper, we will defend an active account of memory according to which 
remembering is a mental action and not merely a passive mental event. According to the 
reconstructive account, memory is an imaginative reconstruction of past experience. A key 
feature of the reconstructive account is that given the imperfect character of memory outputs, 
some kind of control is needed. Metacognition is the control of mental processes and 
dispositions. Drawing from recent work on the normativity of automaticity and automatic 
control, we distinguish two kinds of metacognitive control: top-down, reflective control, on 
the one hand, and automatic, intuitive, feeling-based control on the other. Thus, we propose 
that whenever the mental process of remembering is controlled by means of intuitive or 
feeling-based metacognitive processes, it is an action. 
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1. Introduction 
There has been a recent shift in our understanding of episodic memory. Traditionally 
conceived as the capacity to store and retrieve information from our personal past, 
episodic memory is now thought of as a particular form of a broader cognitive 
function: that of imagining, or mentally simulating, ego-centric events, whether they 
belong to the past or the future, whether actual, hypothetical, or counter-factual. 
Understanding episodic memory as part of this more general capacity for ‘mental 
time-travel’ allows us to account for why it often produces not a reliable 
reconstruction of the specific details of the past, but rather a bare-bones reconstruction 
of past situations that diverge from the remembered events.  
In this paper we seek neither to defend this reconstructive conception of 
episodic memory, nor to argue that it is empirically better grounded than the 
traditional, preservative account (These tasks have been performed by De Brigard 
(2014a), Michalian (2016), and Schacter & Addis (2007), and we refer the interested 
reader to these works). There are at least two ways to understand the constructive 
theory of memory: as episodic hypothetical thought (De Brigard, 2014a), and as 
episodic imagination (Michaelian, 2016), but we need not decide among them here.  
Rather, we assume the imaginative reconstructive conception (but analogous 
considerations should apply to the other version), and ask a further philosophical 
question: does remembering constitute a mental action? Is the imaginative 
reconstruction, or mental simulation, involved in episodic memory, an action? If so, 
what kind of agentive processes and mechanisms are at stake in remembering? 
We argue that in some cases remembering is indeed a mental action. But in 
order to argue for this we have to face objections from thinkers who worry that the 
“ballistic” nature of mental content production leaves no room for agency and control 
in imaginative processes. In particular, Strawson (2003) has argued that although 
there are some cases of mental actions, they take place prior to, and merely ‘set the 
stage’ for, the emergence of mental content. I may agentively try to remember the first 
time I read The Myth of Sisyphus, and these efforts to bring a certain mnemonic 
content to mind may count as mental actions, but the actual imaginative 
reconstruction of the situation in which I first encountered that text (images of the 
place, the time, the people around me, etc.) is not under my agentive control. It occurs 
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spontaneously, in the sense of ‘involuntarily’; its production mechanisms are outside 
of my awareness; I could not control them, as demonstrated by the fact that if I intend 
to not remember the first time I read Camus’ text, I would still end up bringing (at 
least some of) these mental contents to mind.  
This is the objection from mental ballistics: imagination is a ballistic mental 
process, and given that episodic memory is a kind of imagination, episodic 
remembering is also a ballistic process that cannot be a mental action. 
This essay argues against the mental-ballistics interpretation of reconstructive 
episodic memory. We claim that the mnemonic processes that constitute episodic 
reconstruction are not necessarily ballistic, but can count as instances of mental 
action. To show this, (2) we distinguish between two kinds of agentive control: 
reflective and automatic. The latter is often taken to be impossible, because 
automaticity and control are often considered opposites; but we show that there are 
cases of automatic and controlled mental processes. Then we argue that (3) there are 
two levels of metacognition that correspond to the reflective and automatic control 
processes distinguished above, and that automatic, feeling-based metacognition is a 
control process that can be applied to mental processes like remembering. Lastly, (4) 
by looking at the evidence for remembering as an imaginative reconstruction, we 
argue that this process is often characterized by particular forms of feeling-based 
metacognitive control, and that the presence of this control process reveals the 
agentive nature of episodic memory. Remembering is often a mental action, because 
the imaginative reconstruction processes that constitute it are imperfect, and therefore 
need some kind of control. To fill this need, our agentive involvement is frequently 
needed to manage and structure the reconstructive processes, and thus guarantee that 
we produce good memories as an outcome of the episodic reconstruction. When this 
happens, episodic reconstruction is constrained and guided by a process of feeling-
based metacognitive control. 
 
2. Mental ballistics, automaticity, and control 
The idea of memory as reconstruction seems to imply some kind of activity: 
remembering requires bringing the multiple traces of the remembered experience 
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together in a mental simulation of the event (De Brigard, 2014b; Michaelian, 2016). 
Although this looks prima facie like an agential process, there is a difficulty: a 
number of lines of cognitive science research have shown that most of the mental 
processes that shape our daily lives take place automatically: they are fast, associative, 
working-memory-independent, and therefore apparently produced outside of effortful 
cognitive control (for general overviews see Evans (2010b) and  Kahneman (2011)). 
Thus, although the reconstructive account suggests that memory is an agentive 
process, it still has to confront the “threat of automaticity” (Wu, 2013): although 
remembering is a reconstruction, this reconstruction seems to take place automatically 
without the subject’s agential intervention. Wayne Wu remarks that “automaticity is 
what makes decisions about mental agency controversial” (Wu, 2013, p. 244). Most 
philosophers consider memory to be a more or less automatic capacity. In a recent 
paper, for example, Andy Clark claims that “ordinary biological memory, for the most 
part, functions in a kind of automatic, subterranean way” (Clark, 2015). If this is so, 
then calling ‘remembering’ an action is highly controversial.  
The core philosophical issue here is that automatic processes seem to be by 
their very nature non-agential. After all, we tend to call ‘automatic’ those processes 
that are invariably triggered by the same kind of stimuli and respond to them in 
systematically the same way. They are rigid, difficult or impossible to correct, and 
insensitive to novel evidence. In a word, automatic mental processes seem to be 
ballistic: they “run to completion once triggered and cannot be aborted in midcourse” 
(Stanovich, 2004, p. 39). Add to this what Wu calls the “simple connection” between 
automaticity and control: “automaticity implies the absence of control […] by the 
subject” (2013, p. 246). This traditional view has been questioned empirically, but it 
retains a powerful hold over our theoretical intuitions. The simple connection entails 
that agentive control consists in the deployment of top-down attention and cognitive 
effort toward the attainment of a goal, and that automatic processes, being fast and 
effortless, are devoid of agentive control and can participate in it only to the extent 
that they are subsumed under higher-order, cognitively effortful mental processes.  
According to this view, if remembering was to be considered an action, the 
subject would have to concentrate, pay attention, avoid distracting elements, try 
mnemonic strategies intentionally, gather cues…, and all this would imply a certain 
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amount of non-automatic attention, consciousness, and mental effort, even if not 
particularly “strenuous” (Mele, 1997). But even if this happens, even if the 
preparatory ground-setting steps are cognitively effortful and controlled, the very 
process of imaginative reconstruction seems to work spontaneously and sub-
personally: when I remember what I had for dinner last night, I cannot really try to 
remember: the memory traces are assembled and presented as if by magic; all I can do 
at the personal level is try to bring it about that I remember, conjuring the content, 
and wait for it to arrive (Mele, 2009).1 Thus, if automatic processes are ballistic, there 
is nothing particularly agential about them. 
 
2.1. The mental ballistics argument: from imagination to memory 
Given this view of automatic processes as ballistic, Strawson concludes that the space 
for action in the mental is rather small: “the role of genuine action in thought is at best 
indirect. It is entirely prefatory, it is essentially—merely—catalytic” (2003, p. 236). 
The mental phenomena that can be properly called actions are those that ‘set the 
stage’ for the emergence of mental content, but not the content’s emergence itself. 
Setting myself up for tackling a problem may be a mental action; the actual solution’s 
appearance in my mind is not. Bringing my attention back to a task after I have been 
distracted may be a mental action; the subsequent steps involved in completing the 
task probably are not. 
This also applies in the case of imagination. If I ask you to imagine a pink 
elephant gracefully walking on a rainbow, you can do this immediately and 
intuitively, in a way that suggests agentive control: you can picture it big or small, 
you can make it dance, smile or wave its hat. This sense of agentive control over 
imagination is, however, set in a different light if I ask you not to imagine a pink 
elephant at all. Now it is harder to make imagination comply: you may try to bring it 
about that you do not imagine the elephant (by occupying your mind with something 
                                                
 
 
1 This distinction between “trying to X” and “trying to bring it about that X”, plus the claim that one can 
do only the latter with respect to memory, led Mele to revise his earlier view (Mele, 1997) and con-
clude that remembering is never a mental action (Mele, 2009). 
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else), but you cannot directly try to not imagine the elephant. This reveals that the 
actual imaginary content production is a rather ballistic and rigid process that takes 
one input and automatically produces content in a way that is not responsive to the 
agent’s intention, its structure and content (perhaps the experience of control in the 
first case was due to the ease with which the content was produced, rather than with 
proper intentional control). Thus, the imaginative production of mental content seems 
not to be a case of mental action. If so, the only agentive part of the process would be 
the initial mental stage-setting. 
Applied to imagistic production, the argument from mental ballistics goes like 
this: 
i) If M is a mental action, then I can control the occurrence of M by both 
intentionally trying to perform M and intentionally trying not to perform 
M. 
ii) I cannot control the occurrence of P (the imaginative production of a 
mental content) by intentionally trying not to perform P. 
iii) Therefore, P is not a mental action. 
Now, if episodic memory is a kind of imagination, would the same argument apply to 
it? If we ask you to remember what your childhood bedroom looked like, it seems like 
you can exert swift, even effortless control over this process, focusing on different 
aspects of the room (the floor, the positions of the bed and other furniture, the 
lighting…). But if we ask you not to remember your childhood bedroom, the 
recollection process becomes harder to control. Mnemonic contents, like imaginary 
ones, seem to be produced automatically after the reception of a relevant stimulus, 
and therefore, ballistically and outside of the subject’s agentive control.   
 
2.2. The simple-connection reply to the mental ballistics argument 
Here is a way to reply to these arguments: content generation may be automatic and 
ballistic, but it is nevertheless a constitutive part of mental action whenever the 
automatically-generated content is triggered by, and responsive to, the agent’s 
occurrent intention. Call this the ‘simple-connection reply’, since it argues for 
imagination, deliberation, and the like being mental actions, but does so without 
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putting the simple connection (i.e. automatic processes are not controlled) into 
question. 
 Briefly, the strategy is as follows (Wu, 2013): mental action requires the 
production of a specific mental content out of many possible ones (in trying to 
remember my childhood bedroom, I could end up generating images of my current 
bedroom, other rooms of my childhood home, someone else’s childhood bedroom, 
and so on); and so mental action requires selecting the right content to be generated. 
Thus, a certain mental process counts as an action if the produced mental content 
corresponds to the intention’s representational content, since this implies that the 
agent has selected the right content, i.e. has directed her attention to the proper 
content. This can occur only if the agent’s occurrent intention plays a top-down causal 
role in directing attention toward the right content. And to the extent that her intention 
plays this causal role, this process is an instance of agentive control, regardless of 
whether some of its sub-processes are automatic and ballistic. 
 We think, however, that this simple-connection strategy falls short of fully 
answering the problem of mental ballistics, for two reasons. First, although we agree 
that intentions often play this top-down role, the account so far does not explain how 
intentions do precisely that. How does intention’s capacity to coordinate and structure 
automatic processes work? In other words, what makes automatic processes—
otherwise blind, ballistic and unintelligent—responsive to the intention’s content, and 
able to yield adequate results? Although the top-down causal role of intentions should 
certainly be a part of the story of mental agency, there is another part of it that is 
missing, i.e. the part that makes automatic mental content-generation processes 
susceptible to being recruited by higher-order processes. 
And second, if we have no story to tell about the agent’s role in guiding her 
automatic processes, then we must still accept Strawson’s view that the agent 
generates an intention, holds it in mind, and then simply waits for the automatic 
processes—over which she has no control—to generate the relevant content. This fails 
to agree with our phenomenology of mental action: not only do we experience that we 
can bring the relevant mnemonic content to mind; we also feel like remembering is 
sometimes easier, sometimes harder; we feel that a given memory is more or less 
accurate; sometimes we feel that we can remember something if we try harder, 
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whereas other times we simply know that we will not be able to remember, no matter 
how hard we try. All of these phenomena suggest that there is more to agentive 
mental control than simply holding an intention in mind and waiting for the content. 
They suggest that we control not only the top-down initiation of remembering, but 
also (aspects of) the bottom-up production of mental content.  
If this is right, and if content production is an automatic process, then there 
may be a more thorough reply to the mental-ballistics argument than the simple-
connection account. And we think that we should let go of the simple connection 
because there is empirical evidence that some automatic mental processes are also 
controlled. 
 
2.3. Can automatic processes be controlled? 
Psychological research has traditionally considered the concepts of automaticity and 
control as opposites.2 One of the strongest traditional pieces of evidence for the 
uncontrollability of automatic processes comes from Stroop-type effects, where 
unattended dimensions of a stimulus interfere with the attention-demanding task that 
subjects attempt to perform (MacLeod, 1991; Stroop, 1935). Findings like these 
suggest that automatic processes are ballistic: the relevant input triggers them almost 
invariably, and, once activated, they run rigidly to completion. If automatic processes 
are ballistic, they are not in themselves controlled or controllable.   
We present now some evidence that challenges the ballistic interpretation, 
showing that some automatic processes do not respond invariably to the same 
stimulus, or run rigidly to completion once triggered, but rather display contextual and 
normative sensitivity. 
 
 
                                                
 
 
2 The picture has become much more complicated than a duality of opposites. However, the original 
description of the concepts as opposites (Schneider & Shiffrin, 1977; Shiffrin & Schneider, 1977) still 
bears influence on contemporary research, and is therefore worth taking as a starting point for concep-
tual analysis.  
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Automatic processes and context sensitivity 
 The traditional view that automatic processes are reflex-like, activated by the mere 
presence of a given input, carries its influence to this day (Bargh, Chen, & Burrows, 
1996; Gendler, 2008a).3 And yet, no sensible account, no matter how mechanistic, 
could deny the power of context. Stroop effects themselves have been found to be 
modulated by contextual features, like how many dissonantly coloured characters 
each word contains, the participant’s direction of attention, and the goals of the task. 
This suggests that the context that triggers the activation of a given automatic process 
can include not only external features of the environment, but also the agent’s own 
cognitive dispositional and occurrent states. In fact, there is ample evidence that, 
contrary to the ballistic interpretation, automatic process activation is affected by 
“where the current focus of conscious attention is, what the individual was recently 
thinking, or what the individual’s current intentions or goals are” (Bargh, 1997, p. 3).4 
The conditionality of automaticity is so broad in scope that conceiving 
automatic processes as ballistic is a misdescription. If reflexes are indeed triggered by 
the mere presence of the relevant stimulus, then this is a way in which (at least some) 
automatic processes are unlike reflexes, since in many cases there is nothing like a 
clearly identifiable stimulus whose mere presence almost invariably activates the 
same automatic process. The latter, on the contrary, are sensitive not only to a specific 
triggering condition, but also to the agent’s motivational states and occurrent goals. 
                                                
 
 
3 Schneider and Shiffrin defined an automatic process as an activation of a series of neural nodes in 
which “[t]he sequence of nodes (nearly) always becomes active in response to a particular input con-
figuration, where the inputs may be externally or internally generated and include the general 
situational context” (Schneider & Shiffrin, 1977, p. 2). The view has remained influential: “The es-
sence of TASS [=intuitive] subprocesses is that they trigger whenever their appropriate stimuli are 
detected, that they cannot be selectively ‘turned off’” (Stanovich, 2004, p. 52). In a review of literature 
on automaticity in social behaviour, Bargh et al. (1996, p. 252) find that “[r]ecent research has shown 
that attitudes and other affective reactions can be triggered automatically by the mere presence of rel-
evant objects and events, so that evaluation and emotion join perception in the realm of direct, 
unmediated psychological effects of the environment.”—a view that Gendler (2008a, p. 644) quotes 
approvingly. 
4 For the context-dependence of Stroop effects, see Francolini & Egeth (1980), Kahneman & Henik 
(1981), and Besner & Stolz (1999). These studies contributed to the rejection of the traditional view 
that automaticity is attention-independent (LaBerge & Samuels, 1974; Posner & Snyder, 1975; 
Schneider & Shiffrin, 1977; Shiffrin & Schneider, 1977).  
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Automatic error detection and correction 
Several researchers have proposed that automaticity’s core trait is its being 
unstoppable once initiated. This seems phenomenologically correct: when we see a 
familiar word we cannot help but read it, and when we see a person’s face we cannot 
but recognize it as such.5 
 It thus seems that automatic processes are recalcitrant to available evidence, 
so that their behavioural output cannot be cancelled or modified even when we have 
clear evidence for its inappropriateness. Gendler (2008a, 2008b) mentions examples 
like the fear that even wise persons feel when hanging from a precipice despite being 
certain that the cage they are suspended in is completely safe, and the unavoidable 
disgust caused by the prospect of eating delicious, yet feces-shaped, chocolate fudge. 
Such epistemic insensitivity is yet another reason to consider automatic processes 
uncontrollable, since they cannot be corrected mid-performance on the basis of 
updated information.  
Yet phenomenology also suggests that automatic processes are often self-
correcting. When you over-squeeze a plastic cup, you immediately readjust the 
strength applied by your hand. As you walk, run, skate, cycle, etc., you automatically 
adjust your posture on the basis of visual and vestibular cues, in ways so complex that 
explicit calculation would be unable to specify, relying instead on automatic processes 
acquired through practice. In fact, automatic error-correction is so fast and efficient 
that oftentimes we are completely unaware of its occurrence. Koch & Crick (2001, p. 
893) discuss a study in which participants must move their eyes and fingers rapidly 
toward an appearing light at their visual field’s periphery. They reliably do this even 
                                                
 
 
5 For Shiffrin & Schneider, “[s]ome automatic processes may be initiated under subject control, but 
once initiated all automatic processes run to completion automatically” (Shiffrin & Schneider, 1977, p. 
160). Norman and Shallice (1986) consider that, since automatic processes run to completion once 
triggered, any kind of error-correction requires deliberate attentional control. Bargh refers to this as 
automaticity’s “autonomy” (1992, p. 186), and suggests that it is its one core feature. For Stanovich, 
“TASS [i.e. intuitive] processes cannot be turned off or interfered with by central systems. Their oper-
ation is obligatory when triggered by the relevant stimuli […]. TASS processes tend to be ballistic—
they run to completion once triggered and cannot be aborted in midcourse” (Stanovich, 2004, p. 39). 
(See also Logan & Cowan, 1984; Moors & De Houwer, 2006, pp. 301–302). 
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if the light moves a bit to the left or right as their eyes move towards it, and 
interestingly they do not report the light having moved. Thus, automatic processes can 
display an ability to adapt to enviromnental changes, to detect and resolve tensions 
present within the dynamic stream of associative activity (Brownstein & Madva, 
2012; Rietveld, 2008). You probably just performed an automatic error correction in 
reading this paragraph, by reading ‘environmental’ instead of ‘enviromnental’. 
 This automatic normativity is not proper to bodily action: it is also present in 
mental action. In Walsh and Anderson’s (2009) paradigm, subjects were confronted 
with multiplication problems which they could solve using one of two strategies: 
mentally calculating or using a calculator machine. In selecting the strategy subjects 
had also to consider a delay of the calculator machine (4 seconds). There were three 
types of problems: easy, intermediate, and difficult; and two conditions: with 
calculator delay and without delay. The rate time, the accuracy and the cursor 
movement from the starting place to the calculator or to the answering box were 
recorded. Participants quickly initiated a movement corresponding to an initially 
favored strategy, and then decided whether to complete the problem using that 
strategy (or shift to another) by conducting a more thorough evaluation while moving 
the cursor from one place of the screen to another. They often redirected the initial 
movement of the cursor from one strategy to the other showing “imperfect sensitivity 
to the current problem”; but then the “commitment to a specific strategy, which 
occurred later, reflected nearly perfect sensitivity to the profitability of mental and 
calculator solutions” (Walsh & Anderson, 2009, p. 345). Participants showed an 
adaptive behavior by performing mental calculations less frequently as the difficulty 
increased, and more frequently in difficult cases when the calculator was delayed. 
Strategy selections were extremely fast and depended on the interaction between 
problem difficulty and calculator responsiveness. 
Moreover, there’s also fast automatic error detection in mental action. In a 
recent study, Fernández et al. (2016) designed an experiment to test subjects’ 
awareness of their errors in fast mental calculation. Participants were presented with a 
triplet and they had to estimate whether the number in the middle was the arithmetic 
mean of the two other numbers (e.g., 2 4 8) by a Yes/No answer. Participants were 
instructed to press the Yes/No buttons as fast as possible and then report whether they 
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had a feeling of error as fast as possible using again the Yes/No buttons. Time 
pressure was exerted to prevent reflective control and analytical thought. 
Interestingly, the feeling of error reports were strongly correlated with actual 
arithmetic errors; in other words, subjects reported having a feeling of error mainly 
when they had actually committed an error. Additionally, the experimenters tested 
participants’ confidence in their answers when they did not report feelings of error. 
Surprisingly, in these cases participants reported less confidence for wrong answers 
than for right ones, suggesting that in cases where subjects did not have a reportable 
feeling they still had a lower-level awareness of their errors (the feeling of error was 
in ‘fringe consciousness’ (E. Norman, Price, & Duff, 2010)).  
So we have automatic error-detection systems, which sometimes produce an 
explicit feeling of error. Add to this that we are able to not only detect, but also 
correct errors automatically. In a study that compared people’s abilities to correct, 
report, and recall errors (Rabbitt, 2002), participants were instructed to look at a 
screen split into four squares, and press the corresponding button when a dot appeared 
in each square. Group 1 was instructed to immediately correct the mistakes they made 
during the task; group 2 was instructed to press a fifth button every time they had a 
feeling of error; group 3 was randomly interrupted and asked whether they 
remembered having made a mistake in their last three responses; and group 4 was told 
to simply ignore all errors. The stimulus’ duration (the Response Signal Interval, or 
RSI) varied randomly throughout the task between 150ms and 1s. 
The first relevant finding was that for all participants the response that 
followed a mistake was slower than the previous ones. This slowing occurred even 
when they were unable to report or recall the errors. Further, participants in group 1 
were remarkably fast and accurate in correcting their errors: throughout all RSI’s, 
errors were on average faster than correct responses, and error corrections were on 
average even faster than errors. Additionally, participants displayed much more 
accuracy in error correction than in error report or error recall. Across all conditions, 
it took participants much longer to report an error than to correct it, and failed to 
report errors much more often than they failed to correct them. Given that error 
correction can occur notably quickly (as quickly as 40ms after the error is performed 
(Rabbitt, 1966a, 1966b)), error correction cannot depend on reflective recognition and 
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rectification processes; it must therefore be automatic. Crucially, these automatic error 
corrections always increased response accuracy, and never turned a right response 
into a wrong one (Rabbitt, 2002, p. 1082). 
Thus, automatic processes (both mental and bodily) can be sensitive to error, 
and able to perform quick and efficient self-correction without the intervention of 
slower and coarser-grained higher-order processes.6 More specifically, the 
aforementioned evidence suggests that we can perform fast and intuitive error-
detection and -correction processes that are independent from the effortful and 
cognitively effortful processing that relies on working memory. Following dual-
process accounts of human cognition, we distinguish here between automatic or 
intuitive processes that can be performed independently from working memory, and 
reflective processes whose performance requires the use of working memory (Evans, 
2010a; Nagel, 2014).7 Here ‘working memory’ (Baddeley, 2007) refers to the set of 
higher-order cognitive capacities that allow for the mental manipulation of task-
oriented representations.  
Thus, there are two different ways of exerting cognitive control over our 
behaviour: one of them is reflective control—the often slow, effortful top-down 
control that we exert by recruiting working memory in novel or attention-demanding 
tasks. The other is intuitive or automatic control—the fast, rather effortless and 
intuitive control that we exert automatically, without the intervention of working 
memory.  
The cases discussed above reveal that automatic processes are not (at least not 
necessarily) ballistic, evidence-insensitive phenomena. It thus seems too harsh to say 
that automatic processes are “unable to keep pace with variation in the world or with 
norm-world discrepancies” (Gendler, 2008b, p. 570), even if they do behave that way 
in some cases, or with respect to certain kinds of evidence—particularly when it is in 
                                                
 
 
6 For other cases of automatic error detection and correction in sensorimotor processes, see Gordon & 
Soechting (1995), Rabbitt (1990), and Logan & Crump (2010). 
7 Notice that this dual-process approach is significantly different from coarser dual-system approaches. 
(On the general outlook, and the difference between dual-system and dual-process accounts, see Evans 
(2008, 2010b); Evans & Stanovich (2013). 
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the form of novel propositional knowledge. We should rather agree with Brownstein 
and Madva in claiming that automatic processes “can be norm-sensitive in virtue of 
their responsiveness to affective states of disequilibrium. Responsiveness to such 
affective states is flexible, self-modifying, and […] a genuinely normative 
phenomenon” (Brownstein & Madva, 2012, p. 428). Those affective states of 
disequilibrium can, of course, be misguided with respect to the overall available 
evidence (as in the case of the trembling wise man hanging over a precipice from a 
perfectly safe cage), but need not be so: affective states of “felt tension” or “directed 
discontent” can be a part of reliable dynamic on-line error-detection and -correction 
systems. If we use such mechanisms to control mental action, they deserve the name 
‘automatic metacognition’.  
3. Automatic metacognition  
3.1. Control as the mark of action 
Inspired by neuroscientific accounts of motor control (Jeannerod, 2006; Wolpert & 
Ghahramani, 2000; Wolpert, Ghahramani, & Jordan, 1995), recent theorists of action 
have centered their definitions of action on processes of control (Bermúdez, 2017; 
Hopkins, 2014; Mossel, 2005; Pacherie, 2008; Proust, 2005; Shepherd, 2014; Wu, 
2016). From this viewpoint, performing an action requires not just consciously 
intending or trying to do something, but also doing it in a controlled way, exerting 
control over the production of the bodily or mental events.8  
This perspective on action nicely dovetails with the data on automatic control 
summarized so far. In the cited examples, the subject adjusts, corrects, modifies, or 
                                                
 
 
8 Hopkins (2014) has recently appealed to the notion of control to claim that remembering is a mental 
action. However, we are not using the same notion of control. His notion of control refers to a type of 
external causation or determination of the external past events upon the remembered content (“the past 
must somehow control the way I now represent it […] So my representing must be directly determined 
by the episode: how I represent it is causally controlled by how it was, and not via the mediation of any 
other conscious state", p. 324). Our notion of control refers to metacognitive control and, in this sense, 
is internal.  
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simply acts in a given way while exerting an automatic form of control over 
performance. Even though the subject controls her behavior without a need for 
reflection, second-order thoughts and/or metarepresentational awareness, her action is 
sensitive to some normative constraints. Therefore, given the norm-sensitivity of these 
behaviours, the agent can be considered to be exerting agentive automatic control 
while performing them. 
 So, the next question that we should confront is whether there is a similar form 
of automatic control over mental actions, particularly over remembering. 
 
3.2. Mental action and metacognition 
Although the motor control theory works well in the case of bodily actions, we should 
resist the temptation of claiming that the control of mental action is carried out by the 
motor system, as some philosophers have suggested (Campbell, 1999; Peacocke, 
2007). It is unlikely that you have to rely on motor images about your own body 
dispositions, as the motor systems does, in order to control your mental performance 
(Carruthers, 2009a; Proust, 2009). No bodily movement can fulfil a mental action’s 
satisfaction conditions. For example, your mental attempt to retrieve a telephone 
number does not correspond to any bodily movement or to any physical event, 
because you can mentally retrieve the telephone number without moving any muscle 
or changing anything in the world. Therefore, the direction of fit of remembering is 
not world-to-mind, as in the case of bodily intentions (Searle, 1983), since it is not 
necessary that it should involve a change in the world (outside your mind) to be 
satisfied. This fact is basically explained by the nature of mental actions in contrast 
with bodily actions: the former aims at producing an epistemic, emotional, attentional 
or motivational change in the mind, whereas the latter aims at producing a change in 
the body and/or in the world (Kirsh & Maglio, 1994).  
Thus, a first distinction between bodily action and mental action refers to their 
goal and the kind of control the agent must exert to perform it. Whereas in bodily 
action we aim at changing our body posture and/or the world, and use mainly motor 
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control, in mental action we aim at changing the mind and use metacognition.9 
Metacognition is the capacity to monitor and control mental processes and 
dispositions (Proust, 2013). 
 
3.3. Two levels or types of metacognition  
The classic view is that metacognition is thinking about thinking, i.e. forming 
metarepresentations, or second-order thoughts, about first-order mental states (Flavell, 
1979; Nelson & Narens, 1990). Accordingly, metacognition turns the mindreading 
capacity towards oneself, and deploys mental concepts to produce self-ascriptions 
(Carruthers, 2009b, 2011). This type of metacognition has been called “theory-based 
metacognition” (Koriat, 2000), “high-level metacognition” (Arango-Muñoz, 2011), or 
“system 2 metacognition” (Proust, 2013; Shea et al., 2014) in analogy with system-2 
control processes. 
 In contrast, recent studies have proposed that there is a leaner form of 
metacognition that does not require consciousness, theory of mind, or mental 
concepts, and operates implicitly: “Much cognitive control takes place outside system 
2” (Shea et al., 2014, p. 188). Metacognition includes the mental capacity to monitor 
and control mental processes implicitly (Shea et al., 2014), or by means of 
metacognitive feelings (Arango-Muñoz, 2011, 2014; Proust, 2013).10 This type of 
metacognition has been called “experience-based metacognition” (Koriat, 2000) or 
“system-1 metacognition” (Proust, 2013; Shea et al., 2014). 11 
                                                
 
 
9 This is obviously an oversimplification: one may intend to stay still, and in this case there would not 
be any bodily movement involved. 
10 The implicit and the feeling-based views of the low-level metacognition are different. The former 
considers that there can be control in the total absence of consciousness, whereas the latter proposes 
that feelings are the outputs of metacognition and influence control processes. The feeling-based view 
is especially relevant for discussions of mental action. It is these feelings which allow us to claim that 
automatic error-detection and -correction processes, like the ones discussed in section 2, are at work in 
many situations and help the subject to detect and correct her errors: just like you are able to correct 
your posture when you ride your bicycle through vestibular feelings of balance, similarly you are able 
to correct your recollection process when you try to remember through metacognitive feelings of 
knowing, of forgetting, of fluency, and so on (more about this in part 4).  
11 The literature employs a distinction between ‘system 1’ and ‘system 2’ metacognition, so we use 
those terms here, although generally we favor a distinction in terms of process types, consistently with 
our preference for dual-process over dual-system accounts of cognition (Evans & Stanovich 2013). 
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 “System-2 metacognition” is widely accepted, so we will only briefly discuss 
evidence for “system-1 metacognition”, which comes mainly from three domains: 1) 
comparative psychology has shown that animals devoid of mindreading capacity and 
mental concepts pass metacognitive tasks: Rhesus monkeys and bottlenose dolphins 
are able to monitor and control their perceptual and memory capacities (Hampton, 
2001; Smith, 2009; Smith, Beran, Redford, & Washburn, 2006; Smith & Washburn, 
2003). 2) Psychologists have found that subjects very often monitor their mental 
processes based on metacognitive feelings and heuristics, and not necessarily on 
theoretical information (Koriat, 2000). A growing literature shows the important role 
of metacognitive feelings in the control of mental processes (Fernández Cruz et al., 
2016; Koriat, 2000; Schwartz & Metcalfe, 2010). Finally, 3) there seem to be 
differences in the neural activity related to mindreading (system-2 metacognition) and 
system-1 metacognition (Proust, 2012; Schnyer et al., 2004). According to some 
studies, mindreading is correlated with neural activity in the right temporal-parietal 
junction, the prefrontal antero-medial cortex, and anterior temporal cortex (Del Cul, 
Dehaene, Reyes, Bravo, & Slachevsky, 2009; Perner & Aichorn, 2008); whereas 
system-1 metacognition is correlated with neural activity in the dorsolateral prefrontal 
cortex, the ventro-medial prefrontal cortex, and the anterior cingulate cortex (Schnyer 
et al., 2004). 
As argued before, when we exert agentive control through metacognition we 
perform mental actions. So, if remembering is an action, we should exert control over 
our episodic reconstruction processes by means of one of these two kinds of 
metacognition. One can control one’s remembering either by system-2 metacognition 
(i.e., thinking about what one is remembering and making some metacognitive 
inferences about it), or by system-1 metacognition (i.e. monitoring and controlling the 
process of remembering by means of metacognitive feelings). However, since system-
2 metacognition is cognitively very demanding and costly, most of the metacognitive 
control is feeling-based. That is the reason why we will focus on system-1. In what 
follows, we argue that system-1, feeling-based metacognition allows us to exert 
agentive control over the content-production aspect of episodic memory processes. 
  
 
 
18 
4. Feeling-based metacognition and episodic memory 
4.1. Episodic memory as the imaginative reconstruction of the personal past 
The reconstructive theory of memory claims that memory is not the passive retrieval 
of stored representations, but rather the active reconstruction of a representation of a 
past episode: “Remembering is a matter of imagining or simulating the past” 
(Michaelian, 2016, p. 60). However, it is also worth noting that reconstruction takes 
place not only during retrieval, but also during the encoding stage of the process, in 
which memory selects what to retain and how to retain it, often encoding only a gist 
of the remembered event (Schacter & Addis, 2007).  
 If remembering is the action of imaginative reconstruction of a past 
experience, this opens the door for many mnemonic errors such as false recognition 
(Roediger & McDermott, 1995), boundary extension (Intraub, Bender, & Mangels, 
1992), the superportrait phenomenon (Rhodes, 1996), and confabulation (Michaelian, 
2011). Misremembering occurs when a reliable mnemonic system produces a false or 
inaccurate representation of the past. Reconstruction theorists highlight that, given the 
constructive character of memory, misremembering is a systematic and ordinary 
occurrence in our daily lives (De Brigard, 2014a).  
Given the imperfect character of memory outputs, some kind of control is 
needed to ensure the reliability of memory. This is not the preparatory, stage-setting 
control of mental action discussed above (trying to bring it about that I remember X); 
rather, what is required here is control over the automatic imaginative content-
production processes and its reliability (trying to remember correctly). Metacognition, 
the control of mental processes and dispositions, achieves this largely by means of 
metacognitive feelings. 
 
4.2. How metacognitive feelings guide episodic reconstruction 
As we said earlier, memory has a rich phenomenology: recollection is often not an 
immediate mental event, but a lengthy process, and while it is taking place we 
experience not only that we can bring the relevant mnemonic content to mind; we also 
feel like remembering is sometimes easier, sometimes harder; we feel that a given 
memory is more or less accurate; we feel that we will be able to remember something 
if we try harder (e.g., in the tip-of-the-tongue phenomenon), or we simply know that 
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we will not be able to remember, no matter how hard we try; sometimes we feel that 
we are forgetting something we should remember; and so on. All these phenomena 
are metacognitive experiences that convey some information about the way the 
episodic reconstruction process is going, whether it is running smoothly or it has 
found some obstacles, and how serious these obstacles are. As mentioned above, these 
phenomena suggest that there is more to episodic memory control than simply holding 
an intention in mind and waiting for the right content to come. On this respect, 
Souchay et al. remark that “presumably on-line feelings and thoughts generated 
during retrieval by the object level are monitored by the meta-level, leading to the 
implementation of mnemonic strategies, termination of search, and so on” (2013, p. 
1). These phenomena suggest that we not only have control over the global act of 
remembering, but also that, with the guidance of metacognitive feelings, agents have 
some level of control over the reconstruction process. Thus, metacognitive feelings 
enable the agent’s strategic involvement in the mnemonic process, bolstering the 
reliability of the mental content produced. 
 The feeling of knowing (FOK) is one of the most interesting and puzzling 
experiences related to memory. Sometimes, when you are faced with a memory 
problem, even before trying to retrieve the solution, you already feel that you know it, 
that you will be able to reconstruct the memory. In the domain of semantic memory, it 
has been shown that FOKs play a central role in deciding whether to remember a 
piece of information or try another strategy to retrieve the information (Arango-
Muñoz, 2013; Paynter, Reder, & Kieffaber, 2009; Reder, 1987). Although FOK has 
been less studied in the domain of episodic memory,12 it seems likely that this 
experience provides the subjects with a sense of whether they would be able to 
reconstruct a piece of information or not. When asked whether she will be able to 
remember the events that took place at her school graduation, the feeling of knowing 
                                                
 
 
12 Some researchers consider that studying and recalling word lists or sentences is a means to study 
episodic memory and not only semantic. Although we agree that studying and recalling word lists may 
indirectly inform our knowledge of episodic memory, it is not the most straightforward way to study 
this type of memory. 
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will motivate the subject to give a positive answer and to start a reconstruction 
attempt. 
 Subjects also feel that remembering is sometimes easier or harder. The feeling 
of ease has been shown to play a fundamental role in the monitoring and control of 
memory retrieval. According to Koriat’s FOK accessibility model (1993, 2000), the 
accessibility of partial or contextual information relevant to the memory target gives 
rise to this feeling. E.g. immediate or quick access to a song or anthem’s first lines 
gives rise to the feeling of knowing it. Think about what happens when you want to 
tell people a joke you heard earlier: you mentally rehearse the first few lines and the 
punchline, and, if they come to mind easily, this feeling may motivate you to start 
telling the joke, with the (often confirmed) certainty that you will be able to 
reconstruct the rest. But if these traces do not come to mind quickly, you delay the 
start of the joke until you successfully retrieve enough of them. (This is a skill that 
must be learned, which explains why children way too often ruin jokes by starting to 
tell them, and only later realizing they have forgotten the punchline.) Conversely, a 
person may have a feeling of uncertainty, of not knowing or forgetting, which may 
motivate her to give up on the mnemonic reconstruction rapidly. 
We also feel that a given memory trace is more or less accurate, which leads 
us to structure the recollection process in different ways. Some remembered 
information feels right, and some feels wrong. It has been found that the fluency with 
which a memory is reconstructed is a key determinant of the feeling of rightness. 
“Fluency” refers to the ease with which an information is reconstructed, and thus has 
been mainly measured through reaction time, i.e. the speed of the mnemonic 
reconstruction. A memory that is reconstructed fluently (i.e. quickly) feels right, 
whereas a  reconstruction that isn’t fluent feels dubious (Benjamin, Bjork, & 
Schwartz, 1998; Kelley & Lindsay, 1993; Whittlesea & Leboe, 2003). When episodic 
retrieval is accompanied by a feeling of wrongness or doubt, this tends to motivate the 
agent to revise the outcome until the outcome feels more accurate (Gallo & 
Lampinen, 2015).  
The feeling of forgetting also plays an important role in remembering. When 
we try to mentally reconstruct lists of items, scenes, or to-do lists, we often have a 
feeling that we have forgotten something (Halamish, McGillivray, & Castel, 2011). 
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This feeling motivates the subject to revise the mnemonic reconstruction, to seek 
confirmatory cues and traces, and to check if something is missing; this feeling also 
casts doubt on the memory’s integrity.  
All these metacognitive feelings are of vital importance in the agent’s production 
and evaluation of the mnemonic reconstruction, and her further decision of whether to 
endorse the reconstructed information (Michaelian, 2012). Our claim is that when a 
subject is remembering guided by these metacognitive feelings, she is actually 
exerting agentive automatic control over her mental mnemonic processes, since said 
feelings motivate the subject to resolve felt tensions and guide her mnemonic 
reconstruction toward reliability. Thus, given the centrality of agentive control for 
action, when the agent controls her mental processes of episodic reconstruction by 
means of metacognitive feelings, remembering counts as a mental action. Further, in 
feeling-based remembering the metacognitive and the reconstructive processes jointly 
constitute the action, since it is through metacognition that the agent manages to 
structure the automatic reconstructive processes toward the production of a reliable 
memory that she can then endorse.  
5. Conclusion 
The main reason for some philosophers to consider that memory is just a passive in-
formation retention and retrieval capacity is its automaticity. The apparent “ballistic” 
nature of the production of mental content seems to leave no room for agency and 
control. In opposition to this view, we have defended an active account of memory 
according to which remembering can count as a mental action. Our claim differs from 
a “simple-connection” view because we hold that agents are able not only to control 
the top-down initiation of remembering, but also to structure the content-production 
process, monitoring and guiding it by means of intuitive metacognitive feelings. 
Memory, as an imaginative reconstruction of past experience, frequently re-
quires some kind of metacognitive control to ensure its reliability. Drawing from 
recent work on the normativity of automaticity and automatic control, we distinguish 
two kinds of metacognitive control: top-down, reflective control, and automatic, intui-
tive, feeling-based control. We propose that whenever agents control their mental 
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remembering processes by means of intuitive or feeling-based metacognition, remem-
bering is an action.  
Before ending, it is worth making some clarifications. First, our view does not 
entail that metacognitive feelings are perfect guides to reliable memories. We often 
misattribute reliability levels to our memories, and some people are surely better than 
others at producing reliable memories; but to the extent that we can intentionally im-
prove the reliability of our recollections through purely internal mental processes, it is 
largely thanks to our metacognitive feelings. Second, we do not want to exclude high-
level metacognition as another source of mnemonic agency: there are certainly some 
high-level inferential processes at play in some of our remembering routines (like the 
ones present in source monitoring). However, given our tendency to minimize execu-
tive control processes, most everyday mnemonic control processes surely are system-
1 processes (Shea et al., 2014, p. 188), so low-level metacognition seems to be more 
common than high-level metacognition, covering a wider scope of cases. Third, we do 
not claim that all memory-like episodes are mental actions: our claim is that those 
monitored and controlled by agents via feeling-based metacognition are actions; cer-
tainly higher-order metacognition can also guarantee that some others are actions too. 
But we also want to leave room for mere episodic mental happenings or events that 
are not agentive, like the sudden involuntary rehearsal of the song I heard yesterday.  
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